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Abstract 
 This paper investigates the movement of cohort wages in an internal labour market of a large 
British financial institution. The main objective of the analysis is to establish whether movements 
of cohort wages over time in this particular institution are consistent with the theoretical notion of 
an internal labour market as defined in the literature. The influential work by Doeringer and Piore 
on internal labour markets and manpower analysis has most certainly produced a definition of 
internal labour markets, which is still widely quoted.  That is to what extent internal and external 
market forces impact on an employees wage. Additionally the question of what kind of inferences 
can be made with regards to the wage policy of this particular firm is posed.  
The paper follows closely the analysis of aggregate mean cohort wages as outlined in Baker, 
Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994b)
1. They analyse the wage policy of a firm empirically using data on 
management employees of a large financial firm in the USA over the period 1969 to 1988 in 
order to test theories that could rationalize observed wages. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom are in 
fact using the term ‘administered wages’ rather than observed wages. This derives from 
Doeringer’s and Priore’s definition of internal labour markets.  One of the questions asked in the 
BGH paper is how changes in external market conditions impact on wages within the 
organisation. The question is analysed in the framework of a cohort analysis, and the results 
suggest a clear cohort effect that gives evidence of the existence of an internal labour market for 
the financial institution under consideration. The rationale for following BGH’s analysis derives 
from the fact that at present the analysis and understanding of internal labour markets, its 
hierarchical structure, organisation, promotion procedures and above all its wage structure have 
received great attention in theoretical work but still lag considerably in the empirical testing of 
these established theoretical predictions. The reason for this boils down to the difficulty of 
obtaining personnel and payroll data of internal labour markets. Replicating part of the analysis as 
outlined in BGH’s above paper will aid greatly in establishing whether the evidence they find 
only applies to that particular firm or whether their results in terms of wage policy can be 
generalised not only across firms in the same sector but also (as it is in this case) across countries.  
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I. Introduction 
One of the main ideas of internal l abour market theory is that the structure of wages 
within large firms is not as responsive to changes in external supply and demand 
conditions as spot market wages (or as neoclassical theory suggests). This suggests that 
firstly, pay within an internal labour market is not governed by supply and demand but by 
other factors such as predetermined rules regarding the wage structure and as we will see 
the structure of jobs. Secondly, that employees of an internal labour market are to some 
extent shielded from e xternal market conditions which would otherwise impact on their 
wages and consequently, that employees of an internal labour market are to a certain 
degree cut off from competition from the external market. Of course, interaction is taking 
place between the two markets as well. In internal labour market theory the two markets 
touch at so called ports of entry and exit into and out of the internal labour market. Ports 
of entry are usually placed at the bottom of the job hierarchy within an internal labour 
market and once entry is successful, the ‘insiders’ can compete for gaining entry into 
better jobs within the hierarchy. Naturally, if no insider matches the characteristics of the 
job, outsider competition takes place for that job as well but if insiders are available to fill 
in a better vacancy within the hierarchy, they are clearly at an advantage compared to 
outsiders since the firm already has some prior knowledge about the insider’s ability and 
has probably invested into some specific training for the i nsider as well, a cost the firm 
does want to keep at a minimum. This is suggestive of two other features characterising 
internal labour markets which run counter to neoclassical predictions: (i) employees, once 
they enter the internal labour market have the opportunity to compete for promotions and 
in that way create careers and job ladders which in turn manifest themselves in long-term 
employment relationships, and (ii) jobs in internal labour markets have the characteristic 
of being more desirable than external market jobs not only because the wage may not be 
determined by marginal product which reduces the risk of high wage variations but also 
because of the prospect of moving from a good job to a better job. The external labour 
market is constituted of s pot markets and employment contracting occurs through 
information of an individuals characteristics. That is, the only information about the   3
employee’s marginal product is carried by the person’s characteristics and a match will 
be made on the basis of such information. Once the individual has been with the firm for 
some time the firm and the employee are more able to produce a better match. This 
occurs because the firm learns about the individual’s ability and can observe her 
comparative advantages. The employee is also interested to derive at a better match in 
order to minimise her cost of producing effort. In that sense the concept of the job in an 
internal labour market changes slightly to that of spot contracting in that to derive at a 
good quality match the characteristics of the jobs become more important.   
Doeringer and Piore define an internal labour market as “an administrative unit, such as a 
manufacturing plant, within which pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of 
administrative r ules and procedures”  (1971)
2. Exactly how these rules of pricing and 
labour allocation are defined is not explicitly elaborated on in Doeringer’s and Piore’s 
writings. The distinctive features discussed so far concerning internal labour markets and 
the fact that neoclassical theory cannot incorporate them, led to the emergence of a new 
literature, which is still predominantly theoretical in nature, trying to model pricing and 
labour allocation in terms of careers in organizations in internal labour markets. These 
models can be placed in t hree broad categories, (i) building-block models which include 
human-capital theory, job assignment, incentive contracting, efficiency wages, and 
tournaments; (ii) applied human resource management and organization theory including 
politics, social relations and work practices; and (iii) integrative models which address 
patterns of evidence rather than a single aspect of careers in organisations. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom in their above paper focus on on-the-job-training, learning 
and incentives in order t o investigate the wage dynamics of an internal labour market. 
They are specifically interested in three aspects of careers in organizations to infer 
information about the wage policy of the firm: “the relative importance of job levels 
versus individual performance in determining an employee’s wage”, the responsiveness 
of wages to external market conditions, the progression of wages and whether they are 
downward rigid. BGH find that there are clear cohort effects implying that a cohort’s 
average entry wage i s indicative of that cohort’s average wage after years of entry.  Real-
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wage decreases for their sample are rare but do exist for a small fraction of the sample. 
Serial correlation is observed in wage increases. Promotions are highly important for 
wage growth. But although the increase in wages due to promotions are larger than the 
average wage increase that increase is relatively small when compared to the discrepancy 
of the average wage between levels of the job ladder. Employees experiencing substantial 
wage increases within a job level relatively quickly after entry into the firm have a higher 
probability of promotion to the next level than those employees who did not. It is indeed 
possible for BGH, given their empirical evidence, to shed some light on the wage policy 
of their firm. Their firm seems to employ a wage policy that (i) is not as “administratively 
rigid” as the theories of internal labour markets usually suggest and (ii) the three theories 
they employ cannot explain all of the above findings. W hile BGH concentrate in a first 
step on the behaviour of aggregate wages in terms of a cohort analysis and in a second 
step on the behaviour of individual wages, we only analyse the behaviour of aggregate 
wages of our British financial firm in the form of  a cohort analysis, and do not discuss in 
this paper the relative importance of job levels versus individual performance in 
determining and employees wage. Medoff and Abraham (1980,1981)
3 investigate 
empirically to what extent the human capital on-the job-training model can account for 
returns to labour market experience that should be based in productivity growth. They do 
find a strong relationship between experience and relative earnings within levels but no 
or even negative relationship between experience and relative performance within job 
levels. The important implication of their analysis is that the human capital on-the-job 
training model is unable to fully account for their empirically observed return to labour 
market experience.   
The paper is structured as follow. Section I briefly summarizes the three models BGH use 
as a benchmark to interpret their empirical evidence with regards to the firm’s wage 
policy. Section II describes the data we use for the empirical analysis in this paper and 
highlights  some of the similarities and dissimilarities to the firm discussed in BGH. 
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Section III presents the findings of our average cohort wage analysis and section IV 
concludes.    
I. Theoretical background 
One way of approaching the analysis of wage dynamics within firms is the human-capital 
model introduced in Becker’s seminal work on human capital  (1975)
4. Becker 
distinguishes two types of human capital investment. In the context of firms this takes the 
form of training. The first type is referred to as general training. This raises a worker’s 
marginal product in firms across the labour market since the training develops skills of 
equal value to all firms. The second type is referred to as specific training. It increases the 
marginal product of a worker only in a single firm since this kind of training develops 
skills that are only o f value to the firm or employer within which the training is 
undertaken. It is quite obvious from the definitions of general and specific training that in 
the case of the former the worker bears the cost of training. And in the latter the worker 
and the firm both contribute to the cost of training. The cost of training is the opportunity 
cost of reduced productivity during the training period and the benefit is the enhanced 
productivity in the post-training period. In the case of general training, the worker may be 
“poached” by firms because a firm who has provided (and paid for) the training will 
attempt to recoup these costs by paying a wage below the post-training marginal product. 
However, a firm who has not provided the training will be prepared to pay  a wage equal 
to the post-training marginal product because they have no costs to recoup and can 
simply take advantage of the higher productivity. Therefore, workers, not firms will have 
to pay the cost of general training. As a consequence, all workers will be paid a wage 
according to their marginal product. This implies that the worker bears the entire cost of 
forgone wages associated with the training and reap the entire benefit. In the case of 
specific training there is no problem of poaching because the worker’s value to another 
firm is that of an untrained worker. Therefore, when the training is specific the firm bears 
the costs and reaps the gains. The firm is therefore paying a wage in excess of marginal 
productivity during the training period, but can pay a wage below marginal product in the 
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post-training period. Whilst the worker does have no incentive to bear the cost of specific 
training, this would result in the worker receiving the wage of an untrained worker. But 
we typically see a sharing arrangement, where the firm and the worker share the costs and 
the rewards of the training. The way in which wage growth is linked to on-the-job 
training is through accumulation, in this case, of specific human capital via on the job 
training. This should increase with experience. According to this earnings profiles should 
be concave and increasing at a decreasing rate.  And the wage the employer receives 
equals his marginal product, which is an increasing function of human capital.  
Another way to look at wage growth is through learning. Learning models are a variant of 
the human capital model. These learning models also derive predictions of how learning 
impacts on the earning’s profile of an individual. The distinctive feature between the 
learning and human capital models is that in the case of learning models the learning is 
done by the firm and not the employee.  In general, on entry to the firm, the new 
employee is equipped with a set of personal characteristics. Some of these characteristics, 
such as schooling, can be directly observed by the employer and the employer can 
indirectly form believes about an employees innate ability through such a signal although 
it cannot asses a potential employee’s true ability. Once this potential employee enters the 
firm t he employer can observe the employees true ability over time by observing her 
output.  This accumulation of information about the employee’s ability will help the firm 
to not only match her better to a job she may reveal herself to have a comparative or 
absolute advantage in, but will also increase her expected marginal product and therefore 
her wage.  
Faber and Gibbons  (1996)
5 formalise a learning model they call public learning model 
that does not incorporate the possibility of reassignments of tasks and how learning by 
the firm can be used in promotion decisions. In this model individual wages are equal to 
expected and not actual output of the employee. The expected wage is formed on the 
information about the employee and is updated each period. As information becomes 
more and more refined via a process of updating, believes about the employee’s ability 
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change and wage innovations take place. These innovations are independent and serially 
uncorrelated. In this model wages are allowed to increase and decrease over time due to 
the expectation of wage innovations to be zero. This means that observed negative 
changes in real wages must be a consequence of changes in marginal product. This can be 
attributed to either changes in product markets or an employee’s knowledge must have 
become dated. The important implication of this is that it affects jobs, not the w orker. 
Observed real wage declines become specific to the individual. Job reassignments can 
also be introduced into the model. These job reassignments usually take place in the form 
of promotions of workers within the hierarchy. In this case, the firm updates its believes 
about a workers performance in each period and wage increases are linked to observed 
increases in performance. Although the pure learning model does not incorporate job 
mobility and human capital is only added in a simple way, one can easily look at 
consequences of a workers ability affecting the speed at which human capital may 
accumulate. For those who display high levels of ability, human capital acquisition will 
result in a higher return to investment compared to the returns of those who display low 
levels of ability. Therefore, a consequence of the information updating should be that 
high level ability workers are experiencing on average faster growth of wages than low 
ability workers. Secondly, individual wage increments in adjacent years should be 
positively correlated. At the same time wages of high ability workers in separate cohorts 
should converge to one over time and so should the wages of low ability workers in 
separate cohorts because believes about the worker’s ability will become more and more 
precise over time and wages should converge.  
Firms do not only employ learning but also incentive mechanisms, which are also 
important for a worker’s wage growth over his career with the firm. Ideally the firm 
would like to structure an  employee’s contract with the aim to induce the employee to 
maximise her effort. For example, it can structure the employee’s contract in a way that 
she initially earns less than her marginal product and later on more than her marginal 
product. The employee being aware of this will therefore accommodate her perspective 
by realising that the rewards of continuously exerting high effort can be enjoyed in terms 
of higher wages that are above her marginal product at a later day. The firm by initially 
paying the worker a wage below her marginal product tries to avoid a situation where the   8
worker takes an action that cannot be observed by the firm and results in productivity of 
that worker below his ability level. 
Baker Gibbs and Holmstrom point out a crucial difference which bears important 
implications not only for their but also our analysis between the learning and incentive 
models. In learning models without an element of insurance, external market conditions 
do not have an effect on wages. The insurance in the incentive contract between the 
worker and the firm does not need to be renegotiated in the event of the worker 
threatening to quit when mobility costs are high. Therefore wage growth must be 
independent of future market conditions. This allows wages to be different for workers 
who are initially the same on entering if they entered the firm in separate years. This 
average difference in wages on entry should persist between cohorts in the future. 
Therefore in incentive models the wage does not need to equal  expected marginal product 
as it does in the learning model. 
II. Data Description 
 Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom analyse data on all the firm’s managerial employees who 
constitute roughly 20% of the total labour force of that particular firm over the period 
1969-1988. In contrast our data covers the period January 1989 to November 2001 
allowing for a total of 154 monthly observations on each worker employed in the firm. 
The total labour force of the firm described by BGH excluding foreign employees gives a 
total number of 62,957 observations and is similar to the size of the labour force in our 
firm which employs on average 57,494 employees in each year of which on average 20% 
are employed part-time and 80% are employed full-time. Each employee is given an 
identification number in the dataset and amongst other, information on sex, marital status, 
age, level, bank equivalent grade, ethnic origin, job code, work unit code, salary, bonus, 
territorial allowance, performance rating, spells of employment, average weekly 
contracted hours, type of contract and qualification are also available. This analysis does 
not make use of all the data but concentrates strongly on the available data on salary. In 
this paper only full-time employees are included in the analysis where  full-time 
employment is defined as a working week of 30 hours and above. Table 1 shows the   9
aggregate gender composition of those employed full-time between 1989 and 2001. Over 
the period 1989-2001 more women than men were employed full-time in any given year. 
On average the composition of the workforce of full-time employees by gender over the 
whole period consists of 45% full-time male employees and 55% full-time female 
employees. On a year-to-year basis, table 1 shows that the percentage of men employed 
by this firm is very stable and that it only increases slightly over the period, employing 
47.67% men in 2001 as compared to 43.95% in 1989. The change in the gender 
composition of the all full-time employees is also reflected in the ratio of women to men 
in full-time employment, which declines towards the end of the period although never 
reaching a balanced workforce in terms of gender. In this paper we focus our attention on 
the movement of cohort wages in this particular firm over time. Unlike in BGH’s analysis 
we are not restricting our sample to managerial employees but include all individuals 
working full-time to achieve a better understanding of salary movements across the 
whole spectrum of the internal labour market.  
Table 1  Gender composition of full-time employed workforce 
  All  Men  Women  Ratio 
Women/Men 
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  We are therefore dealing with a much more heterogeneous workforce than BGH 
and should consequently expect a slightly different pattern of cohort wage growth over 
time. This in turn should manifest itself in earnings distributions of not only cohorts but 
also of the workforce as a whole to be different to a certain degree over time than those 
analysed in the BGH paper.  The internal hierarchy of this firm as discussed in Treble, 
Gameren, Bridges, and Barmby  (2001)
6 is described by a well defined structure of 12 
levels that can be divided into four broad categories comprised of training levels, clerical 
levels, middle managers and senior managers. In our dataset some employees are not 
graded by the firm and appear as either un-graded staff or un-graded managers. The 
analysis in this paper where composition of workforce is considered in terms of levels is 
based on 14 rather than 12 levels. These are discussed later.  Altogether we observe 13 
yearly cohorts (cohort 1989 to cohort 2001) over the period 1989-2001; unlike BGH we 
are fortunate to have information on the entry month and the entry year of each individual 
in the dataset and therefore do not have to exclude our starting cohort in any analysis that 
requires the use of tenure. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom have to do this since they do not 
know whether those individuals who make up their starting cohort (1969) have either 
entered in 1969 or have already been employed by the firm before 1969. Accordingly, in 
our analysis each cohort is comprised of those employees, working on a full-time basis, 
whose entry date falls into any month in that particular year. The number of individuals 
accounted for in cohort 2001 may be a slight underestimation of the true cohort size since 
data for December 2001 is not available. The average age on entry across cohorts lies 
between 24 and 27 years.  Cohort size on entry to the firm varies from a minimum of 
1499 (cohort91) individuals to a maximum of 8484 (cohort2000) individuals. These 
figures can be translated into cohorts on entry having a total share of 4.1% to 12.9% of 
the total full-time workforce in the firm in the corresponding year. Especially towards the 
end of the period, between 1997 and 2001, the firm recruits more employees on a yearly 
basis.   
On entry we observe that more women than men in each cohort enter the firm.  Men seem 
to be especially underrepresented in cohort 89 but are recruited in higher n umbers in 
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subsequent years. Comparing the percentage of men and women who are still employed 
by the firm in 2001 as a percentage of the number of men and women on entry to each 
cohort shows that for some cohorts more women have left by the end of the period as a 
percentage of women on entry and for other cohorts the same holds true for the 
percentage of men who have left by the end of the period as a percentage of men on entry 
to the firm.  The comparison of these percentages serves to summarize a censoring effect. 
Obviously, employees in cohort 89 have had a longer time horizon over which to leave 
the firm than employees in, for example, 2000. Therefore, the increase in the percentage 
of employees in each cohort continuing employment with the firm as observed from 
cohort 89 onwards, does not come as a surprise. Exit rates of men and women on a year-
to year basis for each cohort point to an interesting pattern: with the exception of men in 
cohort 92 the highest proportion of men and women exiting occurs after two years of 
entry.  The most obvious way of explaining this interesting pattern is found in the 
existence of job specific human capital. The cost of separation in the presence of job 
specific human capital is lower after a short period of employment and higher after longer 
periods of employment. The pattern in the exit rates across cohorts clearly suggests that 
the bulk of employment separation, may it be voluntary or involuntary, takes place two 
years after entry into the firm after which exit rates decline.  Another argument for this 
pattern can be formalised in the existence of an ‘up our out’ policy employed by the firm 
or can give an indication of a two-year training period, which in case of unsuccessful 
completion results in the termination of the contract and in case of success guarantees 
promotion or at least continuity of employment. We know that our firm followed a policy 
by which all non-managerial employees had a six month probationary period after which 
their performance and suitability were assessed and they were either confirmed to the 
permanent staff or were exited either as “resigned unsuited” or “terminated unsuccessful 
probation” depending on whether there was mutual agreement that the probationer should 
leave or not. This policy was pursued until the mid 1990s and did not apply to people 
who were returning to work after a career break. During the mid 90’s there was a general 
change of practice, not policy, with many businesses hiring people on what some call a 
try and buy basis. Recruits w ould join on a fixed term contract usually for three month, 
which would sometimes be extended for another three month. The best people would be   12
retained, and the worst allowed to leave at the end of their contract. Both of these internal 
arrangements concerning probationary practices cannot explain the high rates of exit after 
two years of employment observed across all of the cohorts and do not offer support for 
an up or out policy. 
 For subsequent years, exit rates decline for both men and women in each c ohort and 
again, whether exit is voluntary or involuntary we are not able to say. If separation from 
the firm takes place voluntarily, it may be the case that leavers are able to earn higher 
rewards for their work elsewhere although, as we will shortly see, external wages are on 
average lower than internal wages. This could potentially point to a reward and 
promotion structure that only favours individuals with certain characteristics or jobs 
occupied by certain individuals, making it rather difficult for those who do not have these 
characteristics or are excluded from these jobs to move up in the hierarchy and therefore 
reap the rewards from promotion. Women in each cohort leave the firm’ s labour force as 
well. What we do not know in this case is whether women leave because of career breaks 
in order to commit to family formations or because they are trying to guarantee 
themselves, as men might do, a position elsewhere in the external labour market. Or 
phrased differently, women may be more likely to stay with this firm since the working 
environment suits their personal tastes and guarantees them stability. In short, there are 
lots of potential explanations for any exit rates observed in the data. Again, in the light of 
the analysis focusing on earnings and g rowth in earnings of employees over time, all the 
points mentioned above bear highly important implications for explaining changes in the 
earnings distribution of cohorts and the workforce as a whole. 
As we have already mentioned, the number of employees r ecruited into a cohort is not 
stable over time but varies quite considerably. This seems to be a natural consequence of 
manpower planning within the internal labour market, which in our firm is determined by 
future projections. These projections determine  by analysing historical promotion rates 
for each level within the hierarchy how many employees should be promoted within or 
out of their current employment level and how many new employees need to be recruited 
from the external labour market after internal labour market promotions have been made. 
This form of projection procedure serving to minimise the risk of running into projected   13
shortages very much resembles the traditional idea of manpower analysis within an 
internal labour market as outlined by Doeringer and Priore  (1971)
7 although Doeringer 
and Priore outline more instruments by which to adjust within the firm which also seem 
to be more sophisticated. What we do not know so far is whether the firm under 
consideration also employs more modern ideas for workforce adjustments such as 
incentive mechanisms that should alter the behaviour of employees within the firm and in 
turn should drive the adjustment processes such as promotions, salary adjustments and 
recruitment from outside the internal labour market, just to name a few.  
Table 2  describes the composition of each cohort on entry in terms of levels and gender 
whereas table 3 describes the composition of each cohort in terms of levels and gender in 
2001. Table 2 therefore not only reveals insights into the demand of labour at each l evel 
of the hierarchy over the period but at the same time is a good source to look for ports of 
entry into the firm which is one of the defining characteristics of an internal labour 
market distinguishing it from the external market. Doeringer and Piore f ormulate as 
follows: “…and movement between them occurs at certain job classifications which 
constitute ports of entry and exit to and from the internal labor market”.  Comparing table 
2 and 3 shows how the hierarchical composition of each cohort has changed between two 
points in time but does not indicate whether the increases and decreases in the 
percentages of cohort individuals employed in each level in 2001 is a consequence of 
cohort individuals leaving the firm or getting promoted within the internal  hierarchy.  
Consequently this comparison cannot be used to establish ports of exit but gives evidence 
on ports of entry.  Each table contains 14 levels. S00 and M00 refer to un-graded 
employees in staff, non-managerial, (S) and managerial (M) levels respectively meaning 
that these employees have not been classified within the staff- and management levels. 
S01 is the induction level, S02-S03 are junior staff levels, S04-S05 are senior staff levels, 
M93-M94 are junior management levels, M95 is the middle management level, M96 is 
the senior management level, and M97-M99 is the executive management level. We have 
chosen to name the levels in table 2 and 3 according to how they are classified by the 
firm. 
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Table 2 reveals the recruitment patterns of the firm for cohorts 1989-2001. In any of these 
years the firm recruits outsiders across the whole spectrum of levels in the organisation 
although the percentages of new entrants into these levels varies considerably across 
levels. Managerial levels are defined by a much smaller percentage of new recruits than 
are staff levels and for some cohorts entrance into the two top executive levels (M98 and 
M99) is completely blocked for outsiders. This is particularly true for new female hires. 
Not one of the new female hires in any cohort are recruited into the top two executive 
levels and although men across cohorts are recruited into the lowest executive level 
(M97) in some cohorts on entry, this is not the case for women at all. At the same time, 
the percentage of cohort individuals in any given year who do get a job into these levels 
on entry is only a very small fraction of the overall cohort size. And this is true for both, 
men and women. Although new entrants are recruited into many levels of the internal 
hierarchy, it is  still possible to define levels at which a large proportion of entrants, either 
male or female, enter the firm. This predominantly takes place at the staff levels, and in 
particular at the induction (S01) and junior staff levels (S02-S03) for cohorts 89 and 90 
and from then onwards concentrates strongly on S03, the higher junior staff level and 
S04, the lower senior staff level. But there are exceptions. Nevertheless, these levels can, 
in our view, be defined as ports of entry. But we are, of course, aware that it is a much 
more relaxed definition of ports of entry than Doeringer and Priore established. On the 
grounds of their specific ports of entry definition, our firm would fail to qualify as an 
internal labour market. As a consequence of their definition the particular labour market 
this firm constitutes cannot to a certain degree be shielded from the external labour 
market given that even at high levels in the hierarchy outsiders, and may they only be a 
few, have access to entry. Also, we should not expect to see recruitments into that many 
levels but recruitment should only be concentrated at a small number of levels. Again, 
this phenomenon is not unique to our internal labour market. Holmstrom  (1994a)
8 and 
Treble, Gameren, Bridges and Barmny (2001)
9 have also found evidence of this.  
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Table 2:  Composition of cohorts on entry in terms of levels and gender (%) 
  Men 
  S00  S01  S02  S03  S04  S05  M00  M93  M94  M95  M96  M97  M98  M99 
Cohort89  2.98  26.07  21.15  8.17  5.55  6.13  0.10  15.81  7.70  4.35  1.41  0.58  -  - 
Cohort90  1.19  19.84  27.99  11.76  7.62  9.46  0.13  9.92  5.65  4.40  0.92  0.33  0.07  - 
Cohort91  3.07  9.21  13.57  13.57  16.16  12.44  -  15.51  6.79  6.64  2.75  0.48  -  - 
Cohort92  3.41  8.70  7.87  15.57  19.51  8.93  -  25.73  5.17  3.53  1.76  0.59  0.12  0.12 
Cohort93  3.44  4.30  6.34  6.89  18.78  7.20  12.91  31.92  4.23  2.11  1.64  0.23  -  - 
Cohort94  2.33  8.14  11.22  15.60  14.46  9.23  7.00  20.16  5.58  3.87  1.65  0.51  0.17  0.06 
Cohort95  2.54  9.63  16.57  19.70  9.85  9.10  3.58  15.75  5.67  3.96  2.01  1.42  0.07  0.15 
Cohort96  3.79  6.38  14.71  40.67  6.87  6.76  2.33  11.57  3.08  1.57  1.57  0.54  -  0.16 
Cohort97  5.26  3.75  14.56  38.37  10.59  7.25  1.47  8.72  4.78  2.83  1.36  0.55  0.15  - 
Cohort98  5.38  2.31  10.51  30.00  16.17  8.17  1.12  14.60  5.48  3.28  2.03  0.80  0.07  0.07 
Cohort99  9.81  0.66  12.24  32.27  10.88  8.61  1.17  14.89  5.05  2.46  1.45  0.47  0.03  - 
Cohort00  11.30  0.24  8.63  30.67  13.17  9.92  0.95  10.27  8.26  3.51  2.22  0.79  0.08  - 
Cohort01  11.64  0.37  4.72  31.74  14.30  9.34  1.80  9.56  8.25  4.25  2.82  1.02  0.16  0.03 
  Women 
  S00  S01  S02  S03  S04  S05  M00  M93  M94  M95  M96  M97  M98  M99 
Cohort89  3.02  29.60  27.45  20.56  9.63  3.80  -  3.93  1.28  0.59  0.16  -  -  - 
Cohort90  1.15  19.18  30.43  28.00  10.82  5.64  0.07  3.15  0.92  0.59  0.03  0.03  -  - 
Cohort91  2.05  8.55  17.35  23.98  26.02  12.05  -  6.14  2.29  1.57  -  -  -  - 
Cohort92  2.51  8.83  10.62  26.26  32.01  10.37  -  6.89  1.38  0.89  0.24  -  -  - 
Cohort93  5.25  5.48  9.06  20.19  36.25  8.03  6.12  7.47  1.51  0.56  0.08  -  -  - 
Cohort94  2.69  7.93  11.97  34.52  26.54  5.91  2.50  5.82  1.39  0.58  0.10  0.05  -  - 
Cohort95  2.55  8.25  23.41  30.60  17.87  8.08  2.49  4.87  1.11  0.50  0.11  0.17  -  - 
Cohort96  4.25  4.72  13.22  57.36  9.77  4.65  0.36  3.78  1.20  0.54  0.11  0.04  -  - 
Cohort97  7.08  2.84  12.82  53.91  12.95  4.64  0.43  3.46  0.88  0.75  0.19  0.05  -  - 
Cohort98  6.73  2.44  9.36  46.67  18.56  5.64  0.31  7.54  1.95  0.55  0.23  -  -  - 
Cohort99  10.31  1.07  9.67  50.61  15.42  5.08  0.33  5.00  1.68  0.61  0.18  0.03  -  - 
Cohort00  8.82  0.24  7.96  51.05  17.18  6.56  0.45  4.63  2.22  0.54  0.30  0.04  -  - 
Cohort01  9.82  0.11  5.93  49.74  17.77  6.50  0.87  5.12  2.78  0.95  0.38  0.03  -  -   16
Table 3:  Composition of cohorts in terms of level and gender (%) in 2001 
  Men 
  S00  S01  S02  S03  S04  S05  M00  M93  M94  M95  M96  M97  M98  M99 
Cohort89  0.7  -  0.23  7.49  14.29  14.05  0.23  26.93  21.55  9.60  3.75  0.94  0.23  - 
Cohort90  0.62  -  -  5.23  11.08  20.00  -  31.69  16.31  10.15  3.69  1.23  -  - 
Cohort91  -  -  -  2.15  3.23  10.75  1.08  18.28  29.03  20.43  6.45  5.38  3.23  - 
Cohort92  -  -  -  4.02  12.06  12.06  0.50  26.13  29.65  12.62  1.10  -  -  - 
Cohort93  2.69  -  0.30  2.69  6.57  11.04  -  18.81  30.45  16.42  7.16  3.28  0.60  - 
Cohort94  1.31  -  0.44  5.01  13.51  13.29  -  22.00  22.88  8.93  6.10  4.36  1.31  0.87 
Cohort95  3.86  -  -  7.20  11.83  17.48  -  18.51  23.39  9.25  5.40  2.57  0.26  0.26 
Cohort96  1.03  -  1.38  15.52  17.07  20.52  0.52  21.03  14.83  5.52  1.90  0.69  -  - 
Cohort97  4.10  0.11  1.93  15.59  25.48  15.24  1.71  16.38  9.56  5.80  2.39  1.37  0.34  - 
Cohort98  7.87  0.19  1.12  13.31  21.65  11.62  1.31  20.15  11.25  5.72  3.56  1.97  0.19  0.09 
Cohort99  6.82  0.07  2.70  20.74  19.32  7.84  0.95  25.54  8.31  3.85  3.11  0.61  0.14  - 
Cohort00  9.45  -  4.66  25.67  16.22  10.21  1.31  13.68  10.25  4.53  3.01  0.93  0.08  - 
  Women 
  S00  S01  S02  S03  S04  S05  M00  M93  M94  M95  M96  M97  M98  M99 
Cohort89  1.05  -  -  7.49  37.63  25.96  0.52  18.99  6.27  1.57  0.35  0.17  -  - 
Cohort90  0.50  -  0.50  7.06  40.34  26.22  -  16.64  6.72  1.85  0.17  -  -  - 
Cohort91  1.42  -  -  6.38  24.82  29.79  -  20.57  9.93  4.26  2.13  0.71  -  - 
Cohort92  1.25  -  0.31  13.40  26.48  29.28  -  19.00  8.10  1.56  0.62  -  -  - 
Cohort93  5.06  -  0.60  11.90  25.30  29.76  -  14.29  9.82  2.08  0.89  0.30  -  - 
Cohort94  0.68  0.17  -  8.86  37.31  26.58  -  15.67  7.16  2.56  0.51  0.51  -  - 
Cohort95  4.80  0.18  0.53  15.10  32.33  26.11  0.36  11.90  6.57  1.60  0.36  0.18  -  - 
Cohort96  1.44  0.12  2.28  19.78  35.13  26.02  -  9.47  4.08  1.56  0.12  -  -  - 
Cohort97  4.68  -  2.54  24.20  35.36  18.54  0.41  8.53  3.53  1.80  0.41  -  -  - 
Cohort98  6.04  -  1.01  24.53  36.33  14.60  0.29  11.80  3.38  1.58  0.43  -  -  - 
Cohort99  5.82  -  1.44  36.03  32.25  10.31  0.36  8.93  2.82  1.44  0.48  0.06  -  0.06 
Cohort00  7.89  -  3.89  46.45  22.54  8.27  0.59  6.34  3.03  0.59  0.41  -  -  -   17
Especially women in cohort 91 to 94 bring with them the necessary characteristics to 
enter at the senior staff level.  
Quite interestingly, as from 1996 onwards, nearly half or more than half of the newly 
recruited women enter at level S03 which is a much higher concentration than that for 
their male counterparts.  Especially in 1992 about 32% new male entrants to the firm start 
their career at this level. Compared to the percentage of men entering at the management 
level, the percentage of women into managerial positions is considerably small. 
In summary table 2 shows that the firm does recruit into all levels in the hierarchy but 
that the bulk of new hires enters at the junior and lower senior staff levels although men 
are also recruited into the lower junior staff management. Our hypothesis is that the firm 
after it has carried out it’s recruitment projections does have to employ outsiders as well 
as promoting insiders in order to meet the projections. And this takes place at all levels of 
the hierarchy. Since recruitment takes place at all levels of the hierarchy, recruitment 
considerations should be very much affected by the number of employees who in any 
given year leave the firm but also by how much the firm expands  its production 
processes.  
Table 3 shows the composition of cohorts in terms of levels and genders in 2001. We 
know that for any given cohort, cohort individuals will have left the cohort over time. 
However, the information in table 3 reveals that by 2001 the composition of the cohorts 
in terms of their position within the hierarchy has changed considerably. Obviously this 
change is more pronounced for the earlier cohorts since cohort individuals had more time 
to move up (or down) the hierarchy. For both, m en and women the distribution across 
levels shifts into the direction of higher levels. The fraction of those remaining in the 
induction level is very small for some cohorts and non-existing for other cohorts for men 
and women. The same is true for the lower junior staff level. In 2001 a substantial 
number of men across cohorts is employed in management levels indicating that 
movements up the hierarchy must have occurred throughout the period. Women also gain 
a higher percentage of positions in the management levels across cohorts in 2001 
especially in the junior management level (M93). But again, the percentages for higher   18
management levels do not come close to those held by their male cohort members. A 
large proportion of women in each cohort are employed  in senior staff grades and 
comparing these figures with that of their male counterparts, we can say that the men who 
are still remaining with a cohort in 2001, must have been able to move quicker up the 
hierarchy than the women unless they stay in the same position throughout their 
employment span. This is particularly evident when looking at the change in percentages 
for executive management. Men in most cases have gained access to these positions 
although in some cohorts men in executive management levels must have left the firm as 
well and still other cohorts do not have a male representative in specifically the top two 
executive management levels. For women virtually nothing has changed at the top end of 
the hierarchy except for cohort 99 where 0.06% of  women are in the top executive 
management level. And one or two women in other cohorts have moved to a low 
executive management position (M97). But again at this level women in cohorts 90, 93, 
96, 97, and 2000 have left the firm and were not replaced. But overall the composition for 
both men and women in terms of levels has changed in 2001 and the biggest changes can 
be seen for the earlier cohorts. 
III. Average and Cohort wages 
In this section real average wage movements of cohorts are analysed in comparison to the 
real average wage structure as a whole and the behaviour of entrant real average wages 
over the period 1989-2001. This is used as another device to establish evidence of an 
internal labour market in this firm. It has long been recognised that the existence of 
internal labour markets generates a different wage structure than that predicted by 
competitive theory. Particularly, the structure of wages in an internal labour market does 
not move in accordance with supply and demand changes in the external market but 
remains more stable. It is in this sense that employees of an internal labour market enjoy 
protection from external market influences that impact on their marginal product. Baker, 
Gibbs and Holmstrom do indeed find strong evidence of an internal labour market for the 
American financial firm they analyse in the form of clear cohort effects. The movement 
of insider wages in their firm follows a common pattern that stands in stark contrast to a 
more idiosyncratic movement of entrant wages over time. We have produced the graphic   19
impression of cohort, entrant and organisational level average salary movements as 
presented in figure II of their paper for our firm in figure I.  
We go a step further in that we are also decomposing the overall movement o f cohort 
salary by gender, graphically presented for men and women also in figure I. 
Figure I not only plots real average annual cohort salary but also real average annual 
salary of all employees and real average annual entrant salary against time. In the 
separate graphs form men and women real average annual salary of all male and female 
employees are also plotted respectively. Since the data is collected on a monthly basis, 
our measure of real average salary is a yearly average constructed on the basis of the 
nominal monthly salary of each individual as reported in the dataset. The retail price 
index is rebased to 1989 and used to adjust nominal salary for inflation. The first thing to 
note looking at all employees in figure I is the small variation in real average earnings 
over time represented by the solid dashed line. The evolution of earnings for the firm as a 
whole can therefore be characterised by almost constant earnings growth. On a year to 
year basis organisational level average earnings growth, although of small magnitude, is 
positive except for year 1995 to 1996 where on average percentage growth in real salary 
is zero and for 1996 to 1997 in which employees experienced real negative salary growth 
of  –0.2%.  Averaging over the 12-year period, real salary growth per year is about 2%. 
The path of the average real salary of this firm over time is dissimilar to that observed by 
BGH for the American financial firm. Their firm’s average salary path for all employees 
does show more variation over time and more importantly exhibits real salary declines of 
a rather large magnitude over the first half of the period (1972 to 1981), followed by real 
average salary gains over the later part of the period (1982-1988) which fail to bring real 
average salary back t o its starting level in 1970. Quite contrary, in our British financial 
firm, apart from the discussed predominantly positive and rather stable salary growth, 
mean salary for all employees in 2001 is certainly higher than that observed in 1989.  
Therefore w hat we find, comparing the two financial firms, is the contrasting evolution of 
real average salary for the two firms as a whole; the American firm described by large 
variations in average salary for all employees over time as compared to the British firm 
described by rather small variations in mean salary for all employees over time.   20
The second important feature of figure I is the movement of new entrant’s average real 
salary as depicted by the solid line. It follows, as in BGH, a more idiosyncratic path than 
either mean salary for the entire firm or cohort mean salaries. But this is what we should 
expect to see given that new entrant salary is determined by external rather than internal 
market forces and therefore reflecting changes in external market conditions. Entrant 
average salary either goes up or declines on a yearly basis with entrants in 1991 starting 
on a 23% higher average salary than entrants in 1990 whereas entrants to the firm in 1996 
starting on an average salary 14.4% less than that for entrants in 1995. Of course this may 
not only reflect external market conditions but may also be attributed to either 
higher/lower quality of the entrants themselves or the nature of the job they move into 
depending on the job’s position within the hierarchy of the firm. 
 In the light of the evidence on average salary growth of cohorts over time, discussed in 
more detail below, we also find evidence that entrants starting on high entrant salaries 
relative to that observed by entrants in years characterised by r elatively low entrant 
salaries, usually maintain their salary position or experience high salary growth in 
subsequent years. Entrants to this firm’s labour market experience an average increase in 
income of 47% over ten years. This is 7% higher than the average increase in income for 
the entrants of the American financial firm in BGH. But the entrants in our sample are 
also on average eight years younger than those in BGH and also come from the whole 
range of levels within the hierarchy as opposed to just m anagerial grades. Still, our 
entrants do not experience a doubling in their income in 10 years as described by Topel 
and Ward (1992)
10 although the mean entrant ages are slightly similar. 
 Thirdly, turning to cohort salary movements over time, we do find, as BGH, a strong 
cohort effect. Insider wages in our firm also follow a different growth path than that of 
entrant wages. But whereas cohort wages in the American firm as described in BGH 
move in a parallel fashion, in this firm although cohort wages move in the same direction 
and positively away from the starting wage of each cohort, we graphically observe that 
the path of growth in wages between cohorts may cross. This surely indicates that some 
                                                 
10 Topel, R., and Ward, M. (1992) Quarterly Journal of Economics,"Job mobility and the careers of young 
men" 107, 439-479.   21
cohorts do better than others in terms of wage growth. Secondly, some of the cohort 
wages are very slow in not only reaching subsequent cohorts entry wages but also in 
adjusting to and crossing over the mean real salary of the entire firm. This stands in 
contrast to the behaviour of cohort wages in BGH. Cohorts in BGH tend to secure 
themselves an average salary above subsequent cohort’s salaries and move i n the 
direction of the mean salary of the firm on average in five years. In this firm, however, it 
takes some cohorts a period as long as eight years to do so and therefore especially the 
later cohorts, 1996-2001, are not able to come near to the firm’s mean salary level. In 
stark contrast to this, cohorts 1991 and 1993 to 1995, seem to be constituted of 
employees employed at the higher end of the hierarchy, starting with relatively high 
entrant wages and move to and far beyond the average salary of the entire form in a 
considerably short period of two years.  In essence, as in BGH, the variation in salary 
between cohorts and the position individual cohort members hold over time within the 
firm’s wage distribution does indeed crucially depend amongst others  on starting salary. 
The findings of cohort wage movements in contrast to the behaviour of entrant wages 
over time not only suggests a clear cohort effect in that insiders are protected against 
external market forces but also that the distribution of earnings within the firm changes 
over time given that some cohorts seem to do much better in terms of earnings than 
others. Those individuals in cohorts moving to and above the mean salary of the entire 
firm in a short period of time should consequently move up  quickly in the distribution of 
earnings. Figure I also shows graphs that decompose these findings of average salary 
movements for cohorts, new entrants and the entire firm for the firm as a whole by 
gender over the period 1989 to 1991.  Of course, the general observations discussed for 
men and women in the firm taken together do not change a lot but we are nevertheless 
able to make some interesting inferences. If we compare the growth of entrant wages in 
the three panels of figure I, we find that the idiosyncratic path of new entrant wages is 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The movement of male entrant salaries obviously moves in the same parallel fashion 
but is also much more pronounced than that for all entrants or female entrants for 
which the movement of average new entrant salary is much smoother and more 
constant over time. Yearly changes in male entrant salary range from  –20.5% from 
1995 to 1996 up to 43.9% from 1993 to 1994. This compares with a range of –6% for 
women from 1995 to 1996 up to 15.5% for 1990 to 1991. The gap between female 
and male new entrant’s starting salary in any given year is quite substantial and 
therefore suggests that women are hired into jobs in the lower ranks of the hierarchy 
and men into ranks above those occupied by female new entrants. A second very 
interesting feature that emerges in the gender comparison in the graphs is the position 
of the average salary of the entire firm in relation to male and female new entrant 
salaries and the position of the line describing the evolution of all male or all female 
employees average salary. These last two variables of comparison are added to 
compare performance of female/male cohort wages in relation to the position of 
women/men i n terms of salary in the entire firm. We find that the position of the 
graph representing the average salary of all employees is largely driven by the rather 
low average salaries of the female employees whose average lies well below that of 
the entire firm whereas the male’s average lies far above it.  Adding the growth in 
average salary of cohorts to this decomposition we obviously observe positive wage 
growth for the male and female cohorts over time. Female entrants experience an 
increase in income of 48% over ten years, which is somewhat higher than the 43% 
increase in income for men over the same period. All men in each cohort are doing 
exceptionally well in quickly moving towards the average salary of the entire firm. 
This happens on average after two  to three years. Moreover, especially men in cohorts 
1991,1993,1994, and 1995, which were already identified as those cohorts 
characterised by strong growth in salary are also moving beyond the mean salary of 
all male employees in the firm one to three years after entry into the firm. One thing 
to note is that between 1993 and 1995 men in cohort 1991 have after a two year 
period of strong gains in average earnings a flat earnings profile whereas the women 
in cohort 1991continue to experience positive gains b etween 1993 to 1995. 
Nevertheless, none of the female cohorts manages to adjust its average salary to that 
of the entire firm and only women in the early cohorts enjoy average salaries higher 
than that of all female employees.   24
The conclusions to be drawn f rom the gender decomposition of average salaries in 
this internal labour market are that first of all, the general picture emerging in figure I, 
is mostly driven by the ‘poorer’ position of women in the firm. Secondly, there 
prevails quite a substantial gap between male and female earnings within the entire 
firm but female entrant income growth over ten years is higher than that for male 
entrants. The general movement of cohort salaries are the same for both men and 
women employed by the firm but given the  lower average salaries for women in each 
cohort, we should find that firstly, women are recruited into lower levels than men on 
entry; secondly given that female cohorts are unable to adjust to the mean salary of 
the entire firm and at the same time continuing to experience salary growth, men may 
either have an advantage of promotion over women or men are placed on a fast track 
scheme if it exists on entry to the firm. The decomposition is also helpful in deriving 
inferences for the position of men and women in the distribution of earnings of the 
firm. Women should be predominantly positioned at the lower half of the distribution 
and men at the top. But that is not to say that no women are occupied at the top of the 
hierarchy. We have seen in table 2 and 3 t hat the composition of men and women on 
entry and in 2001 shows differences in terms of where they are positioned in the 
hierarchy and that women are not presented to the extent as men are in managerial 
levels, especially in the two top levels. This obviously feeds through in the above 
graphs via the difference in mean salary cohort members receive for the work they do 
in the firm. But going back to establishing proof of an internal labour market within 
our firm, the main conclusion drawn from this last section of cohort salary movements 
over time is the confirmation of the existence of an internal labour market in this 
British financial firm. The evidence is that cohort individuals are shielded to some 
extent from external market conditions since they do predominantly show mean salary 
and salary growth that lies above the new entrants salary. 
The next step in the average cohort salary analysis involves taking care of any 
compositional effects. Table 2 already presented evidence on the position of new hires 
at nearly all levels of the hierarchy and that entry to the firm is not tied to a few 
specific levels. Entry into staff levels seems to be the norm but women and even more 
men in each of the thirteen cohorts are also recruited into management levels. The 
percentage of men the firms allows into management levels on entry has been shown 
to be considerably higher than that for women. And although these percentages are   25
not outrageously high, the evidence is that recruitment takes place at all levels except 
some  of the executive management levels. Given the high concentration in staff levels 
for new employees we reproduce the evolution of real average annual cohort salaries 
as presented in figure I conditioned for cohort individuals either being in staff- or 
management levels on entry but allowing for progression from then on. There are 
several good reasons for proceeding in this manner. First of all, any outliers in terms 
of salary are eliminated which may drive the processes described in figure I. 
Secondly, and a s a consequence of this, we not only make the two new samples more 
homogeneous but, and more importantly, we may observe the earnings evolution of 
cohort individuals who started employment within staff- or management levels to 
become more similar. We are t herefore looking at the evolution of average salary of 
individuals who are roughly the same on entering the firm. Thirdly, this analysis will 
go beyond figure I in that it derives a more detailed graphical presentation aiding to 
understand more fully the c omplexities of real average annual cohort salary 
movements of all cohort members. Fourth, since this paper is in most parts aimed to 
reproduce analysis carried out in the BGH paper whose analysis rests on a sample of 
employees in managerial positions in a  specific firm, we can, by conditioning for 
being recruited into a management levels on entry, make more inferences about 
possible generalisation of evidence between firms. And in particular this can be 
achieved by specifically analysing the evolution of earnings of cohorts who we know 
are working in management. 
Although we do condition for either being in a staff- or management level on entry to 
the firm, we do allow cohort individuals to freely progress in the hierarchy thereafter. 
The simple reason for this is that firstly our samples particularly for those who entered 
at a staff level would potentially become smaller as cohort individuals progress into 
management levels. But more importantly by unnecessarily cutting out employees if 
we were to condition o n being in a staff level or managerial level throughout the 
employment period, we are also allowing the variation in salary to be cut down. And 
this we effectively avoid by introducing this element of progression.  
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Figure II 
Evolution of real average annual cohort salary conditioned for being in level 1- 



























































































































































































































































































































Evolution of real average annual cohort salary conditioned for being in level 7- 









Evolution of real average annual cohort salary conditioned on being in level 7-level 14 on 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Obviously, there are employees who do leave the firm and one should expect these 
employees to be on relatively low salaries, probably without the ability to move up 
the career ladder in the hierarchy, or maybe bound by their contract to leave after a 
specified period. Therefore attrition is not random. Conditioning in this way, we 
derive salary growth path for those who do progress and at the same time allowing the 
distribution of salary to shift. The new graphs are represented in figure II for those 
who are recruited at staff level and in figure III for those w ho are recruited into 
managerial levels.  
The first visual feeling that springs to the eye comparing figure II and III is how well 
behaved the evolution of average annual cohort salary appears for those who entered 
the firm at the staff levels. Real average salary growth does move in a nice parallel 
fashion across cohorts and incidences of one cohort ‘overtaking’ another are rare. And 
this holds true not only for all who entered at staff level but also once the sample is 
split up by gender. We have already  seen that men in each cohort in the internal 
labour market tend to make much higher mean salary gains during the period than 
women and this is also confirmed by the two conditioned samples in figure II and III. 
If one were to take cohort 89 as a benchmark  case for all other cohorts, then, over a 
12-year period those who entered at staff levels should see an average increase in their 
average salary of 87%. Women should experience an increase of 75% and men an 
average increase of 105%. These figures are much  higher than those for entrants into 
management levels. Again, taking the experience of cohort 89 as a benchmark, men 
and women pooled together should experience an average salary increase over a 12-
year period of 43%, women of 57% and men of 38%. But we need to bear in mind 
that the cohorts change over time in terms of their composition and that the cohort 
mean salary is derived as the mean of all cohort individuals mean salary in the given 
sample. So obviously there is some sample selection effect going on at the same time. 
Mean annual cohort salary growth for those entering at managerial levels is much 
more variable over time than for those in a cohort entering at staff levels.  The former 
start employment at a real mean cohort salary above the average of  all employees in 
the firm except for men in cohort 92 and 99 and progress above and beyond it very 
quickly. This is not the case for women starting at managerial levels. Although 
average salary progression for this group does take place over time, it takes place 
mostly below the mean of all employees employed in any given year. And if gains are   29
made in terms of salary towards or beyond the mean of the entire workforce, it can be 
characterised to be rather slow. This is something we have already pointed out  in 
figure I but we are now able to say that even though women do not make salary gains 
above the mean of all employees in the pooled sample, this finding is largely driven 
by the experience of women who entered at staff levels and suppresses the gains 
women make above the mean salary of all employees if they entered at the managerial 
levels. 
One thing evident from figure II and III is that cohort individuals do move up in terms 
of salaries within the internal labour market which could either be a consequence of 
promotions within levels or promotions to a higher level. And these progressions 
drive the movements in average annual cohort salary in figure I where we have looked 
at real average annual cohort salary growth without conditioning for entry level. What 
we do observe specifically in figure I looking at all cohort individuals should be 
largely driven by the salary gains of men in the cohorts.  So if you are a male new 
entrant you do make salary gains no matter if you start out at staff or management 
levels. So men seem to be at an advantage and should therefore find it easier to climb 
up the hierarchy. Whereas women do tend to struggle a bit especially if they are 
recruited into staff levels. Another distinguishing feature in figure II is the growth 
path  of entrant mean salaries. Surprisingly for those who entered into a staff level, 
entrant salaries are less idiosyncratic than for those who entered the firm at the 
managerial level. The mean entrant salary of men who enter the firm at the 
management level  can now graphically be held responsible for the idiosyncratic 
entrant mean salary growth path as observed in figure I for all cohort individuals and 
especially men. And we can also confirm that this constitutes a very clear similarity 
between managerial employers in the BGH paper and our sample of managerial 
employees.  But there remains an important dissimilarity in the evolution of real 
average annual cohort salary between the American and the British financial firm. 
That is the observed real decline in r eal mean annual salary of cohort individuals in 
the American financial firm over part of the period. Effectively this means that the 
theory of on the job training cannot explain this pattern whereas for our British firm 
the observed and continuous upward m ovement of real salary of cohorts over time can 
be explained on the grounds of on the job training.   30
So far we have paid great attention to a descriptive visualisation of the earnings 
evolution of our cohorts. Although such an analysis greatly helps to get  an idea of the 
direction and the extent to which earnings of different cohorts move over time, it does 
not give us any insight into what forces drive the earning’s growth observed. Quite 
naturally we would now like to move on from the descriptive visualisation of earnings 
growth of cohorts as presented in figure I to empirically investigate the cohort effects 
we observe. We are specifically interested in disentangling the underlying cohort, 
year and tenure effects. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom consider three models, which 
disentangle the cohort, year and tenure effects on earnings, to test if all cohort effects 
are equal to zero or positive. Hence, the model they would like to estimate determines 
average earnings in year t of a cohort entering in year i (Eit) as a function of  tenure 
(Tenuret-i), year (Year t), and cohort (Cohorti) as expressed in equation (1): 
  01t-i2t3i  =  + Tenure Year + Cohort it E aaaa +   (1) 
Of course, model one represents an identification problem due to the linear 
dependencies amongst the explanatory variables and cannot be estimated.  But this is 
not to say that one cannot make any empirical inferences about the cohort effect 
presented in figure  I. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom proceed by estimating equation 2 
which excludes the cohort dummies and allows the effect of tenure on a cohort’s 
earnings to be general by estimating the effect of tenure dummies. 
  01t-i2t  =  + Tenure + Year  it E aaa       (2) 
Secondly, t hey estimate (2) again but impose a linear restriction on the effect of 
tenure in order to test if the tenure effect is linear. A cohort’s average earnings E it as 
expressed in equation 1 and used by BGH is defined as the mean earnings of a cohort 
in year t  which is a subset of all the individual mean earnings of each member in a 
cohort in year t. Although we have followed suit in estimating the same functional 
forms for the British financial firm, we have also estimated the same regression from 
a panel of a ll individuals in each cohort given the vast number of individual 
observations on mean salary. The differences in results are therefore a consequence of 
data organisation. The regression results in table 3 derive from cohort earnings 
regressions based on i ndividual mean salary data rather than aggregated mean cohort 
salary data.  Unless otherwise stated, the following discussion of results is based on   31
table 4 which reports regression results obtained from individual observations in 
cohorts and not aggregated cohort data.  Obviously, the reason for not aggregating 
across cohorts is that the estimates of the coefficients in the regressions will be more 
precise but more importantly should reduce the standard errors of the coefficients 
estimated due to the larger  sample size available from individual observations. We are 
also very much aware of the problem of heteroscedasticity in earnings over time 
which arises once we use individual panel data on earnings for our estimations. There 
are several reasons why we encounter heteroscedasticity in the context of earnings 
evolution in any internal labour market over time. A strong candidate for explanation 
is the ability of employers to learn about their employees ability over time which is 
not revealed on entry to the firm since workers will be pooled initially. Once the 
employer learns about the employees ability through, for example, observing the 
employee’s output, the employer is able to match a workers salary more closely to her 
ability. Consequently, those employees  who reveal high levels of ability will be 
rewarded by salary increases compared to those employees who are observed to 
reveal comparatively lower levels of ability. Therefore, one should expect to see an 
increase in the variance of earnings over time. But  there maybe other explanations as 
well and since we are not able to specify the nature heteroscedasticity takes in these 
models, we are not adopting a proceedure sensitive to the forces that drive 
heteroscedasticity in earnings but instead use White corrected standard errors. 
The regression results of the general and linear tenure model for the american 
financial firm in BGH’s paper indicate, by use of an F-test that, “the tenure effect is 
almost exactly linear”. This observation does not hold true for the  British financial 
firm. The regression results of the aggregated mean cohort salary data only marginally 
reject the general tenure model thereby only marginally confirming linearity. The F -
statistic in this case is 1.924 (the critical F equals 1.95). Running the same regressions 
with data on earnings of all individuals in a cohort shows that the coefficients on 
tenure under specification 1 in table three clearly suggest a nonlinear tenure effect and 
that all the estimated betas do have a significant effect  on average earnings of a 
cohort.  
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Table 4      Cohort salary regressions 
  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 
Dependent 
variable  
Individual mean  
cohort salary 
Individual mean  
cohort salary 
Individual adjusted 
mean cohort salary 
  Coefficient  Standard 
error 
Coefficient  Standard 
error 
Coefficient  Standard 
error 
Intercept  9398.062  107.44  9398.062  107.437  9398.062  107.44 
Tenure      468.04  9.00     
Tenure dummies   
 
No  No 
1990  584.15  63.90     
1991  1654.43  78.37     
1992  2314.78  90.86     
1993  2703.42  101.96     
1994  3325.17  120.48     
1995  3827.87  138.35     
1996  4084.76  147.56     
1997  4148.58  168.91     
1998  3870.99  202.01     
1999  3562.49  194.56     
2000  3588.46  230.39     
2001  4207.37  377.91     
Year dummies           
1990  -361.81  134.18  -302.41  131.46  33.93  138.05 
1991  -324.57  144.56  32.65  135.55  -348.62  142.21 
1992  -350.05  148.14  220.19  139.52  -759.26  147.22 
1993  417.25  158.24  974.01  148.64  -303.45  153.96 
1994  433.73  150.18  966.36  144.25  -475.93  156.53 
1995  675.32  148.12  1251.65  141.97  -325.08  154.06 
1996  660.43  137.34  1192.74  133.90  -194.76  148.15 
1997  824.32  129.78  1258.34  126.49  57.44  144.46 
1998  2015.64  135.71  2381.80  132.35  1407.51  150.47 
1999  2327.67  132.79  2625.19  130.20  2010.70  150.45 
2000  2575.35  131.16  2820.18  128.19  2366.38  152.50 
2001  3323.05  137.60  3564.57  133.27  3025.28  162.37 
Cohort dummies             
1990          -810.33  74041 
1991          2222.61  142.45 
1992          1886.32  146.87 
1993          2041.02  120.69 
1994          1644.00  117.69 
1995          1531.53  140.39 
1996          528.80  107.53 
1997          491.59  111.11 
1998          45.37  119.99 
1999          -626.20  120.62 
2000          -194.95  134.37 
2001          466.74  189.99 
 
Sum of squared errors     26,871,000,000,000   26,929,000,000,000    26,690,000,000,000 
R2                            0.0331     0.0310     0.0184 
Degrees of freedom             224590                        224601                        224590 
N                 224615                        224615                        224615 
            F-statistic for               F-statistic for   33
       Difference from specification 2              Difference from specification 1 
               F = 44.07               F = 126.92 
    
We have also estimated the linear tenure model including a squared term for tenure. 
The p -values on tenure and tenure squared in this case provide strong evidence in 
favour of nonlinearity in the effect of tenure on mean cohort earnings. Testing 
specification 2 against specification 1, the F -statistic for difference from specification 
2 is 40.4, again emphasizing that the general tenure model fits the data for the British 
financial firm much better than the linear tenure model, ruling out linearity in tenure. 
The authors have already pointed out in the graphical presentation of earnings 
evolution of cohorts that average earnings of cohorts of the British firm do not tend to 
conform to the almost parallel average growth path of cohorts observed by BGH for 
the American firm.  
Rejecting the linear restriction on tenure in specification 2 should therefore not come 
as a surprise. The effects of the tenure dummies on average earnings of cohort 
individuals are all positive, significant and the relationship of the two variables is 
concave.  Therefore, the first result in the empirical analysis of cohort effects is the 
nonlinearity in the effect of tenure on individual average cohort earnings for the 
British financial institution in contrast to the American counterpart. 
To make inferences about the cohort effect, BGH proceed by estimating equation 3: 
  102i3t  - (t-i) =  + Cohort + Year it E aaaa   (3) 
This can only be estimated because the linear tenure model is nested in equation 3. In 
essence, average cohort earnings are adjusted by the linear tenure effect and by 
effectively adjusting mean cohort earnings in this particular way, one can now test for 
the significance of cohort effects with regards to  earnings. BGH are indeed able to 
reject the hypothesis that all the cohort effects in 3 are zero and by testing 3 against 2 
in the form of an F-test also conclude that  model 3 is an improvement on the linear 
tenure model.  
Our data has already rejected the linear tenure model and we therefore do not proceed 
by estimating equation 3 adjusting in our case average individual earnings by the 
linear tenure component. Instead we are adjusting individual average cohort earnings   34
by the effect of the tenure dummies from the general tenure model (specification 1). 
The results are presented under specification 3 in table 4. Specification 1 is then tested 
against specification 3, which includes the cohort dummies. The F -value equals 126.9 
presenting evidence that the i nclusion of cohort dummies are not only an 
improvement on the general tenure model but that we can be confident to reject the 
hypothesis that all cohort dummies are zero in equation 1. It is important to 
understand why the general tenure model is nested in our specification 3, which 
adjusts mean earnings by the effect of tenure dummies. It can easily be shown that the 
total sum of squares in the general tenure model must be the same as the total sum of 
squares in our model adjusting earnings by the general  tenure effect. Consider the 
following: 
The general tenure model is given by 
01t-i2t  =  + Tenure + Year it E aaa   
The total sum of squares of the general tenure model is given by 
11 TSS = ESS + RSS ,            (4) 
where the subscripts identify the explained sum  of squares and the residual sum of 
squares as those of the general tenure model. The ESS1 derives from two components, 
ESS11, which comes from the tenure dummies and ESS12, which comes from the year 
dummies. Our specification of the adjusted average cohort earnings model 
(specification 3 in table 3) is given by 
1t-i  02t3i  - Tenure  + Year + Cohort it E aaaa =  
The total sum of squares is given by 
2 2 TSS ESS RSS =+           (5) 
In this case the ESS2 can be attributed to the component derived from the year 
dummies, ESS12 and the component derived from the cohort dummies, ESS22. Since 
the only restriction w e place on the general tenure model is in the cohort dummies, 
á3=0, it is indeed the case that the general tenure model is nested in the adjusted 
cohort model:   35
From the adjusted cohort model we have:  
1112 22 2 TSS-ESS = ESS ESS RSS ++  
Restricting á 3 in the adjusted cohort model to be zero effectively amounts to the 
general tenure model in terms of total sums of squares. Therefore, we have 
established proof that the general tenure model is nested in the adjusted cohort salary 
model and are therefore able to conduct an F -test to establish if the adjusted cohort 
salary model is superior to the general tenure model which at the same time will also 
give evidence as to whether the cohort effects are zero or not. Testing specification 1, 
the general tenure model, against  specification 3, the adjusted cohort salary model 
results in a computed F-statistic of 126.92 which first of all leads to a rejection of the 
null hypothesis that all cohort effects are zero and secondly shows an improvement on 
the general tenure model. 
The cohort effect in specification 3 is again highly nonlinear. This should not be 
surprising given the graphical evidence on cohort wage growth in figure I which 
establishes graphically that the gap in wages of adjacent cohorts is not independent of 
the year of entry of a cohort meaning that the tenure effect cannot be linear. Quite on 
the contrary, what figure I does show is a lot of variation between wage differentials 
of adjacent cohorts. This as we mentioned earlier is attributed to the wage a cohort 
receives on entry to the firm. Entry wages follow a completely different path than 
incumbent wages and we suggest that the variation between wage differentials of 
adjacent cohorts is due to this discrepancy. It is because of this observation that 
specification 3 fits the data much better and picks up on the wage differential and the 
different growth patterns in real wages of adjacent cohorts as opposed to the general 
or linear tenure model because the cohort year model (specification 3) allows for 
entry wages t o move independently of one another plus allowing the growth path of 
real wages of cohorts over time to move in a parallel fashion.     
This following section takes a closer look at the variables included in the three 
regressions in table 4. The tenure dummies in specification 1 give an indication of 
how the returns to specific human capital in the internal labour market of our firm 
evolve and impact on individual mean cohort salary. All the coefficients on the tenure 
dummies are positive and they are increasing.  For example, employees with 12 years   36
of tenure earn on average £4207.37 more than an employee who just entered the firm, 
holding everything else constant. Therefore specific human capital acquired while 
working for the firm is an important aspect of mean salary growth. Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom do not actually state the coefficients on the tenure dummies for their 
sample and we are therefore unable to make a comparison. Obviously the effect of 
tenure is not lost in specification 3, the individual a djusted mean cohort salary model 
since by adjusting for tenure we have effectively incorporated the tenure effect into 
the dependent variable. The coefficients on year dummies 90, 96 and 97 in our 
preferred specification 3 are not significant but all others are.  Some of the 
coefficients on the year dummies are negative but by not as much as those produced 
by BGH.  But the coefficients do confirm that there are differences on entry and that 
there are dissimilarities between salaries in different years. But  overall, the situation 
seems to be improving in the organisation with especially the later year dummies 
showing high and positive coefficients. The coefficients on the cohort dummies are 
mostly positive except for cohort dummies 90, 99 and 2000. Obviously  the 
coefficients on the cohort dummies are derived from a complexity of the state of 
external market conditions and compositional factors. The cohort effects are nonlinear 
which they should be since external market conditions are reflected in the highly non-
linear path of entrant salary.   The returns on earnings for individual cohorts are larger 
for some than for other cohorts when measured against cohort 89, holding everything 
else constant. We have already accepted that cohort effects are significant and the 
coefficients on cohorts only give us an idea of how being in a given cohort affects 
those cohorts’ average annual earnings. A next natural extension of the individual 
cohort salary models would be to include variables such as level and education 
dummies in order to see how much of the effect of the cohort dummies is due to these 
compositional and the personal characteristics of the cohort employees. Also, the 
regressions should be run by gender and ethnicity as well to get an even more detailed 
picture of how the discussed effects may potentially vary between the groups. 
 
IV Conclusion 
The first conclusion to be drawn from our analysis is the existence of an internal 
labour market in the British financial firm. We have seen in figure I-III that the firm 
shields its employees from external labour market conditions once they have entered   37
the internal labour market. Throughout the period all cohorts enjoy positive earnings 
growth above the external market rate. Hence, a clear cohort effect exists in this firm. 
But the evolution of average earnings of individual cohorts, although moving in the 
same upward direction, is different in terms of magnitude. Because the cohorts in the 
British financial firm do not experience real salary declines over the period, which is 
not the case for the American financial firm, on the job training can account for the 
earnings growth observed in figure I -III. Without question, future work needs to 
address in more detail the extent to which the implications of human capital on-the-
job-training model account for the observed salary growth. This should be based in 
productivity growth and hence, empirical work on experience and relative 
performance of cohort individuals within job levels of the hierarchy needs to be 
carried out in order to assess to what extent they account for increasing returns to 
labour market experience. 
 Another interesting feature of the earnings evolution of cohorts is that the salary on 
entry seems to determine how earnings evolve thereafter. Cohorts starting o n a 
relatively low entrant salary experience slower and less growth in earnings than 
cohorts who start on a high entrant salary. Learning theories that are based on the 
assumption that the expected marginal product of a worker should equal his wage run 
into difficulties explaining the persistent effect entrant salary exerts on the earnings 
evolution of a cohort. The updating mechanism firms use to update their believes 
about the ability of their employees should in the limit lead to the convergence of 
salaries within the groups of high and low ability workers. As a consequence we 
would expect salaries within these groups to converge across cohorts. Therefore the 
wages of workers across cohorts are not solely determined by expected marginal 
product. The difficulty with this implication of the theory arises only if firms are 
completely uninformed about new entrants and as a consequence offer a pooled 
contract on entry. If on the other hand firms have partial information on new hires, 
low average wages on entry  and subsequent lower growth in earnings of a cohort 
reflects on the lower average ability of a cohort. 
The analysis in this paper does not shed much light on the extent to which incentives 
drive the observed earnings growth of cohorts. If a tournament type model was 
assumed in which remuneration of an individual’s performance is based on the   38
relative rank the individual holds in the organisational hierarchy and not his output 
level, wages will differ from realized marginal product. Analysis presented by Audas, 
Barmby and Treble11 which actually uses personnel data of the British financial firm 
discussed in this paper to ‘investigate empirically the respective roles of incentives 
and good fortune in an hierarchical promotion system’ in the context of a tournament 
model as introduced by Lazear and Rosen (1981)12 offers support for earnings growth 
being driven by incentives. Their empirical evidence suggests that effort is a positive 
function of price spread and that effort is a negative function of luck, empirically 
supporting the two main theoretical predictions of tournament theory as outlined in 
Lazear and Rosen (1981). The implications for the context of this analysis are that 
incentives do indeed appear to work and hence, are also a possible explanation for the 
observed earnings growth of cohorts.  
This paper has also shown that the earnings evolution of male and female cohort 
individuals differs quite substantially although the cohort effect and the general 
direction of earnings growth are roughly the same. M ale cohort individuals are clearly 
at an advantage in terms of relative salary growth compared to women even though 
the gender composition of the cohorts in terms of their position within the firm moves 
in the same direction. A closer inspection of the evolution of earnings of men and 
women according to at which level they entered the firm indicates that the entrant 
salaries of men entering at managerial levels is highly idiosyncratic as in BGH sample 
of managers. This is not the case for women who enter as managers. So the 
idiosyncracy mainly derives from manager’s entrant salary but is not the case for men 
and women entering into staff levels. This is important to point out because we may 
not conclude that starting salary has long lasting effects on salary growth once we 
condition for entrant levels and that this is only true for those entering into managerial 
levels. Although, salary growth of individuals being recruited as managers is not as 
well behaved than that of those recruited at staff level. Future work needs to address 
these findings in a more detailed and regression based framework. Secondly it needs 
to pay closer attention to the distribution of earnings over time. The cohort effect 
needs to be broken down into the compositional and external market factors in order 
                                                   
11
 Audas, R., Barmby, T., Treble, J. forthcoming in Journal of Labor Economics,"Luck, Effort and 
Reward in an Organisational Hierarchy". 
12 Lazear, E. P., Rosen, S. (1981) Journal of Political Economy,"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimal 
Labor Contracts" vol. 89, 841-864.   39
to establish if the compositional or the external market factors drive the results in this 
paper. Also, promotion procedures and job mobility in the hierarchy need to be 
analysed because they have an important impact on salary growth. I n this way one 
moves away from an aggregate analysis to an emphasis on individual determinants of 
the evolution of earnings. In such a framework one can then make predictions as to 
whether incentive mechanisms are also largely at work within the firm’s wage setting 




Audas, R., Barmby, T., Treble, J. forthcoming in Journal of Labor Economics,"Luck, 
Effort and Reward in an Organisational Hierarchy". 
Baker, G., Gibbs, M., Holmstrom, B. (1994a) Quarterly Journal of Economics,"The 
internal Economics of the firm: evidence from personnel data" 109, 881-919. 
Baker, G., Gibbs, M., Holmstrom, B. (1994b) Quarterly Journal of Economics,"The 
wage policy of a firm" 109, 921-955. 
Becker, G. (1975) "Human Capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special 
reference to education", University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Doeringer, P., Priore, M. (1971) "Internal labor markets and manpower analysis". 
Farber, H., and Gibbons, R., (1996) Quarterly Journal of Economics,"Learning and 
wage dynamics" 8, 1007-1047. 
Lazear, E. P., Rosen, S. (1981) Journal of Political Economy,"Rank-Order 
Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts"  vol. 89, 841-864. 
Medoff, J. L. and A., Katherine (1981) Journal of Human Resources,"Are those paid 
more really more productive? The case of experience" 16, 186-216. 
Medoff, J. L. and A., Katherine. G. (1980) Quarterly Journal of 
Economics,"Experience, performance and earnings" 95, 703-36. 
Topel, R., and Ward, M. (1992) Quarterly Journal of Economics,"Job mobility and 
the careers of young men" 107, 439-479. 
Treble, J., Van Gameren, E., Bridges, S., Barmby, T. (2001) Labour Economics,"The 
internal economics of the firm: further evidence from personnel data" 8, 531-
552. 
 
 
 